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DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE PREVENTION OF
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS
Since 1971, when Congress removed all statutory barriers to govern-
ment appeals,I the double jeopardy clause2 has become the sole determinant
of the government's right to appeal in criminal cases. Accordingly, the
United States Supreme Court for the first time has taken a self-defined
"closer look" at policies underlying the double jeopardy clause in an
attempt to bring restrictions on governmental appeal rights into sharper
focus. 3 Concern for the accused underlies the Court's approach to double
jeopardy. A second trial denotes greater risk, embarrassment, expense and
ordeal, as well as conferring on the state a "potent instrument of oppres-
sion." 4 In taking a "closer look," the Court has viewed the main objective
of the double jeopardy clause to be the prevention of multiple prosecutions;
not the prevention of government appeals . Following this objective, the
Court has consistently allowed government appeals where success of those
appeals would not require new prosecution. 6 Conversely, the Court has
found the double jeopardy clause to bar any government appeal where a
successful appeal would necessitate a new trial.
7
A second prosecution is allowed, however, after a conviction is re-
versed on appeal. 8 Various rationales 9 have been offered to justify this
result, which seems to be contrary to the purpose of the double jeopardy
clause. A fairness rationale is used to justify retrial when the reversal is for a
procedural error. 10 This rationale is logically sound and it is widely accept-
1. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-644 §14(a), 84 Stat.
1880 (1971) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3731). See text accompanying notes 19-21 infra.
2. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that no
"person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
3. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975).
4. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564,568 (1977). See United States
v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
5. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 346-47 (1975). Another objective of the double
jeopardy clause is to prevent the government from punishing a defendant twice for the same
offense. See Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
6. United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1(1976); United States v. Rose, 429 U.S. 5 (1976);
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
7. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); United States v.
Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962).
8. Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950). See text accompanying notes 82-128
infra.
9. See text accompanying notes 86-114 infra.
10. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1895). See text accompanying notes 86-92 infra.
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ed. 1' The fairness rationale means that it is simply fairer to both the
defendant and the government to allow retrial because the accused's right to
a fair trial corresponds to society's interest in punishing the guilty. As a
practical matter, if double jeopardy barred retrial, appellate courts would not
be as zealous as they now are protecting the accused's rights to a fair trial by
overturning convictions. Thus, by allowing retrial, both the defendant's
rights and society's interest are served.' 2
When reversal is for insufficient evidence, a waiver rationale is used to
justify retrial. 3 This rationale is weak and has been severely criticized.14
The waiver rationale rests on the principle that a defendant waives double
jeopardy protection by requesting a new trial as a remedy on appeal. 1 5 This
rationale allows retrial after a reversal for insufficient evidence even if the
defendant prayed for an acquittal on the basis of insufficiency but alterna-
tively requested a new trial on the basis of procedural error.1 6 In other
words, a remedial request for a new trial for procedural error constitutes a
"waiver" of double jeopardy protection, and retrial is permitted although
the ground for reversal was insufficient evidence.
This note will identify and examine the analytical framework which has
emerged from the Court's "closer look" in government appeal cases. These
cases include government appeals of, for example, post-verdict dismissals
of indictments, post-verdict suppression orders, post-verdict acquittals,
mid-trial acquittals, pre-trial dismissals, and acquittals after a jury is dis-
charged for failure to reach a verdict. An examination of these cases will
reveal that the court has consistently followed the general rule that a
government appeal is permitted wherever its success will not require a
second prosecution. Thus, any post-verdict ruling by a district court is
appealable because its success will not require a second prosecution but
merely the reinstatement of a guilty verdict.' 7 Conversely, appeals of mid-
trial acquittals and acquittals following a mistrial because of the jury's
failure to reach a verdict are not allowed because multiple prosecutions
would be required if these appeals were successful.18
11. See, e.g., Sumpter v. DeGroote, 552 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 n. Il (1975).
12. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
13. See text accompanying notes 93-114 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 114-131 infra.
15. See text accompanying notes 93-114 infra.
16. See text accompanying notes 116-118 infra.
17. United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1 (1976); United States v. Rose, 429 U.S. 5 (1976);
United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975); United States v. Allison, 555 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir.
1977); United States v. Burnette, 524 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. De Garces, 518
F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1975).
18. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977); Fong Foo v. United
States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
This note will then take its own "closer look" at rationales which
permit multiple prosecutions after a conviction is reversed on appeal. The
weakness of the Court's theoretical framework in this category of cases will
be illustrated. In particular, the Court's adherence to a waiver rationale will
be shown to be inconsistent with the principles which have emerged from
the Court's look at government appeals.
GOVERNMENT APPEALS: A CLOSER LOOK
Federal governmental appeals in criminal cases cannot lie without
express statutory authorization.19 In 1971, Congress authorized the govern-
ment to appeal in any criminal case except "where the double jeopardy
clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecutions."-
20
Prior to the 1971 enactment, it was largely unnecessary for the Court to
consider the constitutional limitations of government appeals because of the
restrictions imposed by Congress on the government's authority to appeal. 21
However, after 1971, the Court had to take a "closer look" at restraints on
government appeals.
Government Appeals of Post- Verdict Orders
The Supreme Court initiated this approach in 1975 in United States v.
Wilson .22 The defendant in Wilson was found guilty by a jury of converting
union funds to his own use. 23 The district court dismissed the indictment on
a post-verdict motion, ruling that the delay between the offense and indict-
ment prejudiced the defendant. 24 The government appealed the post-verdict
ruling and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the double
jeopardy clause barred the government's appeal. 25 The United States Su-
preme Court then granted certiorari.26
The Court reversed the Third Circuit's dismissal of the government's
appeal, reasoning that "(t)he development of the Double Jeopardy Clause
from its common-law origins . . . suggests that it was directed at the threat
of multiple prosecutions, not at Government appeals, at least where those
19. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336 (1975); United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S.
310, 318 (1892).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1972). See note I supra. Prior to the 1971 amendment, the govern-
ment was allowed to appeal in limited instances as authorized by Congress under the Criminal
Appeals Act, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (1907). See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 336-39
(1975) which traces statutory history. See also United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 307-08
(1970). However, note that the statute of limitations is also a limitation to government appeals.
21. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977).
22. 420 U.S. 332 (1975).
23. This was in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1970).
24. 420 U.S. at 333.
25. 492 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (3d Cir. 1973).
26. 417 U.S. 908 (1974).
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appeals would not require a new trial." 27 Because a successful appeal by the
government would not require a new trial but would merely result in the
reinstatement of the guilty verdict, the Court held that the appeal in Wilson
was not barred by the double jeopardy clause.
28
In determining constitutional restrictions on government appeals, Wil-
son found that the prohibition against multiple trials was the controlling
constitutional principle .29 Thus, any government appeal could be authorized
by Congress as long as success of the appeal would not result in a second
trial. At the heart of the policy of avoiding multiple trials is the concern that
the :state shall not be permitted to re-try the accused, "thereby subjecting him
to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibil-
ity that even though innocent he may be found guilty.''30 A government
appeal also involves for a defendant personal strain and anxiety as well as an
obvious enhancement of the likelihood of conviction. In Wilson, the Court
recognized these concerns but noted that "a defendant has no legitimate
claim to benefit from an error of law when that error could be corrected
without subjecting him to a second trial."
31
In a companion case to Wilson, United States v. Jenkins,32 the Court
held that the double jeopardy clause barred government appeals where their
success would result in "further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the
resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged."
33
In Jenkins, the defendant was charged with violating the Selective Service
Act for "knowingly refusing and failing to submit to induction into the
armed forces of the United States." 34 After a bench trial, the district court
filed written findings of fact and conclusions of law, dismissed the indict-
ment, and discharged the defendant. 35 The government's appeal was dis-
missed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the ground that the
double jeopardy clause prohibited further prosecution. 36 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's ruling, noting that success of
the government's appeal would not result in reinstatement of a guilty verdict
because no such finding had been made by the district court.
27. 420 U.S. at 342.
28. Id. at 352-53.
29. Id. at 345-46.
30. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
31. 420 U.S. at 345.
32. 420 U.S. 358 (1975).
33. Id. at 370.
34. 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1970).
35. 349 F. Supp. 1068, 1073 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
36. 490 F.2d 868, 880 (2d Cir. 1973).
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In reaching its decision, the Court examined the district judge's find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. The government had argued that the
district court's dismissal of the indictment was attributable to an erroneous
conception of the law and that all the factual issues necessary to support a
finding of guilt under the correct legal standard were present in the district
judge's findings. 37 The Supreme Court, however, noting that there was no
finding of the statutory element of "knowledge," was unable to determine
whether the dismissal of the indictment was based on an erroneous concep-
tion of the law or whether the dismissal was premised on the failure of the
state to prove each essential element of the offense. 38 The Court, therefore,
treated the discharge of the defendant as an acquittal and found double
jeopardy to bar any government appeal. The Court's rationale was that
reversal and remand would have required further proceedings to resolve the
factual issue of "knowledge," an element of the offense charged. 39 Thus,
Jenkins expanded Wilson by holding that further proceedings going to the
elements of the offense charged, although less than a full retrial, can trigger
double jeopardy protection.
Recently, the Supreme Court affirmed the principles of Wilson and
Jenkins in United States v. Morrison.4° In Morrison, the defendant was
charged with possession of marijuana and the intent to distribute an unlawful
substance. The district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the
marijuana on the grounds it was obtained by an illegal search and ultimately
entered a guilty verdict. Before sentencing, the district court reconsidered
and granted the motion to suppress. The government appealed this order and
the court of appeals dismissed the appeal because it felt double jeopardy
would bar retrial. On review by the Supreme Court, it was found that the
government's appeal would not violate the double jeopardy clause because
success of that appeal would result only in the reinstatement of the general
finding of guilt rather than further factual proceedings relating to guilt or
innocence. 41 Thus, the Court, by following the Wilson test, held that the
government could appeal an order of suppression entered after a general
finding of guilt.
42
37. 420 U.S. at 367.
38. Id. at 367-68.
39. Id. at 368-70. If the Court had found that all the factual issues necessary to support a
finding of guilt were present and that the district judge applied an improper legal standard, it
apparently would have allowed a government appeal. If this were the case, query how a guilty
verdict could be entered if the government's appeal of the dismissal of the indictment proved
successful.
40. 429 U.S. 1 (1976).
41. Id. at 3-4.
42. Id.
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Government Appeals Of Pre-Trial Orders and Mid-Trial Acquittals
Besides appeals of post-verdict orders, 43 the government can also
appeal any pre-trial order which was granted before jeopardy attached.44
The rationale justifying this type of appeal is that double jeopardy protection
is afforded only if the accused has actually been placed in jeopardy. 45 Thus,
in Serfass v. United States,' the Court held that the government could
appeal a pre-trial order which dismissed an indictment.47 The defendants in
Serfass had claimed that the ruling of the district judge dismissing the
indictment was based on the merits and, therefore, constituted the functional
equivalent of acquittal. Disagreeing, the Court noted that the label "acquit-
tal" was without significance until jeopardy had attached. The Court
adhered to the view that jeopardy does not attach until a jury is empaneled or
sworn, or, in a bench trial when the judge begins to receive evidence. 48 In
other words, the government can appeal any order in the defendant's favor if
the order was granted before double jeopardy attached.
Other constitutional rights become closely interrelated with double
jeopardy rights when it is determined that jeopardy has attached. 49 For
example, in Fong Foo v. United States,5" the right of defendants to have a
jury proceed to verdict was closely intertwined with the defendants' double
jeopardy rights. The defendants in Fong Foo were brought to trial before a
jury for conspiracy and concealment of material facts from a government
agency. 51 During the testimony of the fourth government witness, the
district judge directed the jury to return verdicts of acquittal.52 The govern-
ment appealed and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, noting that the
district judge had no power to order the acquittal, vacated the judgment of
acquittal and ordered the district court to reassign the case.13 The United
States Supreme Court accepted the defendants' claim that they had been
twice placed in jeopardy and noted that once jeopardy attached in a jury
43. See text accompanying notes 22-42 supra and notes 73-84 infra.
44. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
45. Id. at 387, 389-94. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568
(1977); Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 471 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); Downum v.
United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737-38 (1963).
46. 420 U.S. 377 (1975).
47. Id. at 394.
48. Id. at 391.
49. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1971); Downum v. United States, 372
U.S. 734, 736 (1963); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949). See cases and commentaries
cited in note 73 infra.
50. 369 U.S. 141 (1962).
51. Id. at 141.
52. Id. at 142.
53. In re United States, 286 F.2d 556, 565 (1961).
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trial, a defendant is entitled to a verdict from the jury. The Court went on to
hold that the district judge's mid-trial order directing the jury to return
verdicts of acquittal triggered double jeopardy protection, was final, and
could not be reviewed on appeal even though the acquittal was based upon
an "egregiously erroneous foundation." ' 54 Thus, a mid-trial acquittal,
correct or not, cannot be appealed by the government.
Fong Foo is a unique case because it involved an acquittal before the
government's case-in-chief was closed. The district judge had no authority
to grant the acquittal at this stage of the trial and notably no such authority
exists today." But Fong Foo's holding is valid today and it is consistent
with the Court's general rule which only allows the government to appeal
where there will be no further prosecution. In Fong Foo, jeopardy attached
when the jury was empaneled .56 Although the acquittal had no valid founda-
tion, it foreclosed the possibility of an acquittal from the original jury. A
successful government appeal of this judgment would have necessitated a
second jury and a second trial. This type of multiple prosecution is pro-
hibited by double jeopardy. Therefore, the government cannot appeal a mid-
trial acquittal.
Government Appeals of Acquittals After a Mistrial
Both pre-trial orders57 and post-verdict orders 58 are appealable by the
government, whereas, mid-trial acquittals are not. 59 Yet, whether a defend-
ant can be retried after a mistrial is declared because of the jury's failure to
reach verdict depends on whether the district judge grants an acquittal. If no
acquittal is granted after a mistrial, a second-trial is possible. 6° Conversely,
a second prosecution is not permitted if an acquittal is granted. 61
This rule was announced in United States v. Martin Linen Supply
Co.62 Martin involved an acquittal granted under rule 29(c) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which authorizes a defendant to move for
judgments of acquittal at specified times.63 In Martin, the question before
54, 369 U.S. at 142-43.
55. See note 63 infra.
56. See text accompanying notes 44-49 supra.
57, Id.
58. See cases cited in note 17 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 51-56 supra.
60. See note 73 infra.
61. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
62. Id.
63. FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 provides:
(a) Motion before Submission to Jury. Motions for directed verdict are abolished and
motions for judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place. The court on motion of a
defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or
more offenses charged in the indictment or information after the evidence on either
side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or
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the Court was whether the double jeopardy clause prohibited a government
appeal from a judgment of acquittal entered after the jury was discharged for
its failure to reach a verdict. In answering this question in the affirmative,
the Court reasoned that the district court's judgment of acquittal was a
determination that the government's evidence was legally insufficient to
sustain a conviction. 64 The district court's ruling thus represented a resolu-
tion of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged and a
termination of a trial in which jeopardy had long since attached. Further, the
Court cited Fong Foo and noted that such a resolution, correct or not, was
final and could not be reviewed because "a successful government appeal
reversing the judgments of acquittal would necessitate another trial."
6
1
Chief Justice Burger dissented66 and argued that Martin was indistin-
guishable from United States v. Sanford,67 decided earlier in the term. In
Sanford, after a jury trial had ended in a mistrial and a second trial was in its
preparatory stages, the trial court dismissed the indictment. The Court
characterized the dismissal as a pre-trial ruling made "prior to a trial that the
Government had a right to prosecute. "68 Chief Justice Burger thus argued
that once the jury was dismissed in Martin, the defendants ceased to be in
jeopardy in that proceeding because they could no longer be convicted. He
therefore felt that the judgment of acquittal was a ruling made prior to a trial
that the government could rightfully bring. 69
The majority decision, however, distinguished Sanford, on the
grounds that, there, a judgment of acquittal was not entered. The Court
noted that the critical factor was whether the appeal was of a pre-trial order
or whether it was an appeal of "a legal determination on the bases of facts
adduced at the trial relating to the general issue of the case.' '70 To determine
offenses. If a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence
offered by the government is not granted, the defendant may offer evidence without
having reserved the right.
(b) Reservation of Decision on Motion. If a motion for judgment of acquittal is made
at the close of all the evidence, the court may reserve decision on the motion, submit
the case to the jury and decide the motion either before the jury returns a verdict or
after it returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict.
(c) Motion after Discharge of Jury. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or is
discharged without having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment of acquittal may
be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further
time as the court may fix during the 7-day period. If a verdict of guilty is returned the
court may on such motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment of acquittal. If no
verdict is returned the court may enter judgment of acquittal. It shall not be necessary
to the making of such a motion that a similar motion has been made prior to the
submission of the case to the jury.
64. 430 U.S. at 572.
65. 430 U.S. 564, 570-73.
66. 430 U.S. 564, 581 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
67. 429 U.S. 14 (1976).
68. Id. at 16.
69. 430 U.S. at 582-83.
70. Id. at 575-76.
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the nature of the judge's ruling, the Court announced the test to be "whether
the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution,
correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense
charged." 71 Finding the district judge's ruling to be an acquittal in substance
as well as form, the Court refused to attach any constitutional significance to
the timing of the judge's ruling and concluded that "judgments under Rule
29 are to be treated uniformly.'"72
Martin's holding is consistent with the general rule that the govern-
ment cannot appeal where a successful appeal will necessitate a second
prosecution. Thus, the acquittal in Martin was final because reversal of that
judgment would have required a second prosecution.
Government Appeals of Post-Verdict Acquittals:
An Appellate Interpretation
Martin and Sanford are the controlling Supreme Court authorities as to
when a retrial may be permissible after a mistrial .7 However, the broad
language of Martin that rule 29 acquittals are to be treated uniformly has
created some confusion as to whether a rule 29 acquittal rendered after a
guilty verdict is appealable by the government. Before Martin, both the
Second74 and Fifth 75 Circuits had allowed such appeals by following the
general rule that double jeopardy does not bar any appeal where its success
will not require a second prosecution. Thus, these circuits had permitted the
government to appeal judgments of acquittal entered after a jury verdict of
guilty because a successful appeal would only result in reinstatement of the
guilty verdict. Subsequent to Martin, the Seventh Circuit examined this
71. Id. at 571-73.
72. Id. at 573-76.
73. Where a mistrial is declared sua sponte, by a district court because of a hung jury and
no rule 29 acquittal is made, Sanford notes that retrial may be permissible. 429 U.S. at 16. The
classical test utilized by the Court in this situation to determine whether double jeopardy bars
retrial was first stated in United States v. Perez, 9 U.S. (I Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824):
We are of opinion that the facts constitute no legal bar to a future trial. The prisoner
has not been convicted or acquitted, and may again be put upon his defense. We think,
that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with the authority
to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends
of public justice would otherwise be defeated.
If the defendant requested a mistrial the manifest necessity test does not apply. See United
States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484-85 (1971);
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 735-36 (1963); Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364,
368-69 (1961). See generally Note, Twice in Jeopardy: Prosecutorial Appeals of Sentences, 63 U.
VA. L. REv. 325 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Twice in Jeopardy]; Comment, 69 Nw. L. REV. 887
(1975); Note, 33 MD. L. REv. 211 (1973); Comment, 45 Miss. L.J. 1272 (1974). See also United
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 484 n.Il (1971); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 468 n.3
(1964). See text accompanying notes 50-56 supra.
74. United States v. De Garces, 518 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1975).
75. United States v. Burnette, 524 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 939
(1976).
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question in United States v. Allison. 76 In its opinion the court discussed
Martin, which was decided by the Supreme Court the day that Allison was
argued orally.
77
The defendant, Allison, was charged with knowingly making a false
statement to the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.78 After the
jury found Allison guilty, the district judge set aside the verdict and entered
a judgment of acquittal. 9 In deciding whether the government had a right to
appeal, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the observation in Martin on the
desirability of uniform treatment of acquittals under rule 29 as necessarily
accepting the principles announced in Wilson. The focus of Wilson was
whether a new trial would be necessary. Thus, the Seventh Circuit found
''reason to distinguish" between an acquittal following a guilty verdict and
an acquittal following a mistrial. In the former situation, no retrial is
necessary because, if there is a reversal of the acquittal on appeal, the guilty
verdict can be reinstated.8 0
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Martin is consistent with the
theoretical framework of Wilson and Jenkins. Wherever success of a gov-
ernment appeal will not necessitate a new trial or further proceedings going
toward the elements of the offense charged, but will only involve the
reinstatement of a guilty verdict, the double jeopardy clause is inoperative.
Thus, although the most fundamental rule of double jeopardy jurisprudence
is that a verdict of acquittal cannot be reviewed on error or otherwise, 8' a
judgment of acquittal under rule 29 following a jury verdict of guilty is
appealable by the government. Jenkins provided direct support for this
position when the Court stated:
[W]here the jury returns a verdict of guilty but the trial court
thereafter enters a judgment of acquittal, an appeal is permitted.
In that situation a conclusion by an appellate court that the judg-
ment of acquittal was improper does not require a criminal defend-
ant to submit to a second trial; the error can be corrected on
remand by the entry of a judgment on the verdict. 2
Further, there is direct support for the Allison Court's position in the
Advisory Committee Notes explaining rule 29(c). 3 The Notes state that
"(n)o legitimate interest of the government is intended to be prejudiced by
permitting the court to direct an acquittal on a post-verdict motion."
76. 555 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1977).
77. Id. at 1386.
78. Id. at 1386-87.
79. The judgment was entered under FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c). See note 62 supra.
80. 555 F.2d at 1387.
81. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671 (1896).
82. 420 U.S. at 365.
83. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c) and accompanying Advisory Committee Notes, 18
U.S.C.A. app. R. 29.
84. Id.
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If the Court in Martin desired to change the theoretical framework of
Wilson and Jenkins, the Court should have stated this explicitly. Therefore,
the broad language of Martin regarding its refusal to attach constitutional
significance to the timing of an acquittal should be limited to the factual
situation of Martin, in other words, to mistrial cases. Any post-verdict
ruling by a district court in the defendant's favor should be appealable. This
is true whether the ruling is an order to suppress evidence as in Morrison or
a dismissal of an indictment as in Wilson or an acquittal which is a
determination that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction as in
Allison. However, a mid-trial acquittal as in Fong Foo or an acquittal
rendered after a mistrial as in Martin should not be appealable because there
is no guilty verdict to reinstate and a successful appeal will necessitate a
second prosecution.
REVERSALS OF CONVICTIONS AND RETRIAL
The theoretical framework that has emerged from the Supreme Court's
"closer look" at governmental appeal cases has had its effect elsewhere.
Many lower courts have applied the principles, which have emerged from
the Court's "closer look," in determining the issue of retrial of a defendant
whose conviction has been reversed on appeal.85 Any retrial is contrary to
the policy underlying the double jeopardy clause, the prevention of multiple
prosecutions. Therefore, modern courts, in determining the issue of retrial,
are careful to scrutinize the rationales justifying another prosecution.
Rationales for Retrial After Reversal for Procedural Error:
From Presumptive Waiver to the Fairness Rationale
Over eighty years ago in United States v. Ball,86 the United States
Supreme Court held that double jeopardy did not bar retrial of a defendant
whose conviction was reversed on appeal because of a procedural error. In
Ball, the reversal was due to a defective indictment. The theory underlying
that decision is that a convicted defendant waives his right to plead former
jeopardy by the mere act of filing an appeal,87 In other words, if the
defendant's appeal is successful, he has presumptively waived his double
jeopardy rights under the fifth amendment.
85. See, e.g., Sumpter v. DeGroote, 552 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wiley,
517 F.2d 1212, 1215-21 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Barker, 425 F. Supp. 1283, 1285 (W.D.
Mo. 1977). See generally People v. Woodall, 61111. 2d 60, 64-65, 329 N.E.2d 203, 205-06 (1975);
People v. Brown, 99 Ill. App. 2d 281, 293-302, 241 N.E.2d 653, 660-64 (1968); Hervey v.
Colorado, 178 Colo. 38, 495 P.2d 204, 208 (1972); State v. Moreno, 69 N.M. 113, 364 P.2d 594
(1961).
86. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
87. See Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 531-34 (1905); Twice in Jeopardy, supra
note 73, at 330.
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A little over sixty years after Ball, the Court rejected this presumptive-
waiver theory in Green v. United States .88 There, the Court noted that a
waiver involves a "voluntary knowing relinquishment of a right." The
Court labeled the presumptive-waiver theory "fictional" because a defend-
ant has "no meaningful choice" in deciding whether to serve his sentence or
appeal his conviction and "waive" constitutional rights.
89
The current explanation by the Court for a Ball result is that it is
"fairer to both the defendant and the Government." This position was first
announced by Justice Harlan in United States v. Tateo9° and was finally
adopted by a majority of the Court in Wilson, 91 the first case to take a
"closer look." Justice Harlan in Tateo explained the fairness rationale as
follows:
While different theories have been advanced to support the per-
missibility of retrial, of greater importance than the conceptual
abstractions employed to explain the Ball principle are the impli-
cations of that principle for the sound administration of justice.
Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is
the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he
has obtained such a trial. It would be a high price indeed for
society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punish-
ment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible
error in the proceedings leading to conviction. From the stand-
point of a defendant, it is at least doubtful that appellate courts
would be as zealous as they now are in protecting against the
effects of improprieties at the trial or pretrial stage if they knew
that reversal of a conviction would put the accused irrevocably
beyond the reach of further prosecution. In reality, therefore, the
practice of retrial serves defendants' rights as well as society's
interest. 92
Because Wilson affirmed the result of Ball and adopted the "fairness
rationale," courts freely permit retrial where reversal is for procedural error.
In this situation, retrial is justified by the "fairness rationale" despite the
objective of the double jeopardy clause, prevention of multiple prosecu-
tions.
Rationales for Retrial After Reversal for Insufficient Evidence:
The Affirmative Waiver Theory
In Bryan v. United States,93 decided in 1950, the Court expanded the
Ball rule to situations where the reversal was based on insufficient evi-
88. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
89. Id. at 191-92.
90. 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
91. 420 U.S. 332, 343 n.ll (1975).
92. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964).
93. 338 U.S. 552, 560 (1950).
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dence. Besides the presumptive-waiver theory, Bryan's holding is also
underlied by a closely related waiver theory. This theory, which may be
termed an affirmative-waiver theory, postulates that a defendant's request
on appeal for a new trial affirmatively waives his double jeopardy rights. In
Bryan, the defendant sought a new trial on appeal as one of his remedies .
94
Thus, two possible theories, the presumptive-waiver theory and the affirma-
tive-waiver theory, comprise the basis of Bryan's holding.
The presumptive-waiver theory was rejected by the Court in Green v.
United States95 seven years after Bryan. In contrast, the affirmative-waiver
theory clearly retains vitality in the Supreme Court as well as lower federal
courts.
9 6
The affirmative-waiver theory was evident in Yates v. United States. 
97
There, the Court reversed the convictions of fourteen defendants who were
charged with Smith Act 98 violations and ordered the acquittal of five defend-
ants against whom the evidence was clearly insufficient. However, in
remanding the other nine defendants for a new trial, the Court, citing
Bryan, noted that a retrial order and a refusal to order acquittal would be
justified "even where the evidence might be deemed palpably insufficient
particularly since petitioners have asked in the alternative for a new trial as
well as for acquittal.'"'
The affirmative-waiver theory was also implicit in the Court's decision
in Forman v. United States.l°0 In Forman, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed the defendant's conviction because of improper jury
instructions and remanded the case with instructions to enter a judgment of
acquittal.' 0 ' However, upon rehearing the court of appeals modified its
ordered for an acquittal and entered one directing a new trial.10 2 The
defendant argued before the Supreme Court that the appellate court's initial
order was final and that the modified order for a new trial violated double-
jeopardy. 103 The Court was unpersuaded and affirmed the appellate court's
order for a new trial. In Forman, Ball and Bryan were relied on by the
94. Id. at 560.
95. 355 U.S. 184 (1957). See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 97-119 infra.
97. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
98. Smith Act, § 2(a)(1)(3), 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2385 (1940) (repealed 1948).
99. 354 U.S. at 328 (emphasis added).
100. 361 U.S. 416 (1960).
101. 259 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1958). Forman involved a reversal for procedural error and not
one for insufficient evidence. It was decided after the presumptive-waiver theory was rejected
but before the fairness rationale was adopted. Today, its result would rest on the fairness
rationale. However, it is discussed here because of its relevance to the affirmative-waiver
theory.
102. 261 F.2d 181, 183 (1958).
103. 361 U.S. at 421.
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Court for the general principle that a person can be retried when his
conviction has been set aside on appeal and he requests a new trial as one of
his remedies. 1
0 4
The defendant in Forman relied on Sapir v. United States. ,05 In Sapir,
the defendant's motion for acquittal was denied by the district court. On
appeal, the conviction was reversed, and the cause was remanded with
instructions to dismiss the indictment because the evidence was insufficient
to sustain a conviction. 106 The government then succeeded in persuading the
court of appeals to modify its order and grant a new trial on the basis of
newly discovered evidence. The Supreme Court vacated the modified order,
reinstating the former one which instructed the trial court to dismiss the
indictment. The Court, in a brief per curiam opinion, gave no citations or
justifications for its decision. However, Justice Douglas concurred and
noted that the guarantee against double jeopardy prevents retrial of a defend-
ant who is acquitted on appeal for insufficient evidence, just as it prohibits
retrial of a defendant who is acquitted by a trial judge for the same reason. 107
The Court in Forman distinguished Sapir in three ways and limited
Sapir to its own facts. First, it noted that the action of the court of appeals in
Sapir was based on new evidence. Second, it noted that Sapir involved
insufficient evidence while Forman dealt with an improper jury instruction.
Finally, the Court noted that the defendant in Forman requested a new trial
whereas no such motion was made in Sapir. The Forman court cited to the
Douglas concurrence in Sapir, noting that Justice Douglas felt the control-
ling factor determining retrial was whether the defendant requested one. 
108
Bryan, Sapir, Yates and Forman find the affirmative-waiver theory to
have constitutional significance. Following this theory, the Second," °
Fifth,"l0 Seventh 1" and Eighth'12 Circuits allow retrial after a reversal for
insufficient evidence. These courts similarly hold that a defendant can only
preserve his double jeopardy rights by not requesting a new trial on appeal.
Thus, they only permit a second prosecution if the accused requests one.
United States v. Robinson"3 illustrates the approach of these circuits. In
Robinson, the defendant's conviction was reversed for insufficient evi-
104. Id. at 425-26.
105. 348 U.S. 373 (1955).
106. 216 F.2d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 1954).
107. 348 U.S. at 374 (Douglas, J., concurring).
108. 361 U.S. at 425-26.
109. United States v. Robinson, 545 F.2d 301, 304 n.5 (2d Cir. 1976).
110. Greene v. Massey, 546 F.2d 51, 53-56 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Carter, 516
F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Blake, 488 F.2d 101, 107 (5th Cir. 1973).
111. United States v. Fusco, 427 F.2d 361, 363 (7th Cir. 1970).
112. United States v. Diggs, 527 F.2d 509, 513 (8th Cir. 1975).
113. United States v. Robinson, 545 F.2d 301 (2d Cir" 1976).
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dence. In deciding the issue of retrial, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit found the controlling factor to be whether the accused requested a
new trial. The Second Circuit thus interpreted Bryan as sustaining a court's
power to order a retrial only when the defendant asks for one. Because no
such request was made in Robinson, the Second Circuit held that double
jeopardy barred a second prosecution."1 4
The Fallacy of the Affirmative- Waiver Theory
The fallacy of the affirmative-waiver theory is that it does not involve a
voluntary waiver. In Green v. United States,"15 the Court rejected the
presumptive-waiver theory noting that a waiver involves a "voluntary
knowing relinquishment of a right." The Court labeled the presumptive-
waiver theory "fictional" because the defendant had "no meaningful
choice" in deciding whether to serve his sentence or appeal his conviction
and "waive" constitutional rights. 1 6
Similarly, the affirmative-waiver theory does not involve a meaningful
choice. Instead, it involves coercion because an appellant is forced to limit
his appeal to the sole issue of insufficency. If he prays alternatively for a
new trial on the basis of a procedural error of law by the trial judge, he will
"waive" his constitutional rights of not being placed twice in jeopardy.
This is an absurd result since a defendant's assertion of one right on appeal
forces him to forfeit a constitutional right. It is particularly unjust because
most appeals involving claims of insufficiency also involve claims of error
pertaining to procedural matters. In other words, a remedial request for a
new trial for procedural error should not be taken as a quid pro quo surrender
of constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 11
7
One district court forced by stare decisis to follow the affirmative-
waiver theory, nevertheless stated:
to make the right of retrial dependent upon the filing of an alterna-
tive motion for a new trial by a convicted defendant may have a
chilling effect on the defendant's desire to seek an alternative
order for a new trial in the district court for trial errors, when he
believes he has a meritorious motion for judgment of acquittal. "8
The affirmative-waiver theory developed as a conclusory label for a
Ball result. In these situations a request for a new trial was used by courts as
a convenient label for a conclusion that retrial was permissible. For a court
114. Id. at 304 n.5.
115. 355 U.S. 184 (1957). See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
116. 355 U.S. at 191-92.
117. See C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 470 (1969); Twice in Jeopardy,
supra note 73; Comment, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 365, 367-68 (1964); see generally Fisher, Double
Jeopardy: Six Common Boners Summarized, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 81, 81-83 (1967).
118. United States v. Barker, 425 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
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to say simply that "you asked for it" is a superficial rationale. The real
constitutional principle allowing retrial is not that the defendant "asked for
it" but that society has a great interest in re-trying a defendant whose guilt
was clear but who did not receive a procedurally fair trial." 9
Sumpter v. DeGroote:
A Proposed Model Utilizing the Fairness Rational
The "closer look" government appeal cases illustrate that the double
jeopardy clause is aimed at the prevention of multiple prosecutions. How-
ever, a multiple prosecution is allowed where a defendant's conviction is
reversed because of a procedural error of law. This is justified by the
"fairness rationale." On the other hand, the affirmative-waiver theory,
though still utilized, is not a valid rationale justifying retrial of a defendant
whose conviction has been reversed for insufficient evidence. However, can
retrial in this situation be justified by the "fairness rationale?"
Recently, the Seventh Circuit examined this question in Sumpter v.
DeGroote. 120 This case is representative of a methodology which applies the
principles of the Supreme Court's "closer look" in government-appeal
cases to situations involving reversals of convictions. In Sumpter, the
defendant was charged with prostitution under an Indiana statute which
provided in part that "any female who frequents or lives in a house of ill
fame, knowing the same to be a house of ill fame, or who commits or offers
to commit one (1) or more acts of sexual intercourse or sodomy for hire,
shall be deemed guilty of prostitution. "'121
Sumpter's conviction by a jury was reversed on appeal because the
state failed to present any evidence that Sumpter was a female.' 22 The state
appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court. That court affirmed Sumpter's
conviction in part and remanded the case to the trial court for a determina-
tion of her sex.' 23 On remand, Sumpter's claim of double jeopardy was
overruled and the trial court took judicial notice that Sumpter was a female,
rejected Sumpter's rebuttal evidence and found her guilty. Sumpter ap-
pealed, claiming that the limited remand placed her in double jeopardy. Her
119. See authorities cited in note 117 supra.
120. Sumpter v. DeGroote, 552 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1977).
121. IND. CODE § 35-30-1-1 (1971) (emphasis added). The statute, amended in 1975, now
provides for "any person" rather than any female. 1975 Ind. Acts 325, § 8.
122. Sumpter v. State, 296 N.E.2d 131, 133 (Ind. App. 1973).
123. Sumpter v. State, 261 Ind. 471, 483, 306 N.E.2d 95, 104 (1974). The Indiana Supreme
Court determined that the method of proof to determine a defendant's sex was in need of
modification. Therefore, they established a new procedure whereby the lower courts would
take judicial notice of the defendant's sex and remanded the case to determine Sumpter's sex
according to the new procedure. Id. at 473-74, 306 N.E.2d at 98-99.
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double jeopardy claim was subsequently accepted by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit,' 24 which received the case on appeal from a district
court's dismissal of her petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
In dicta, the court critized the Bryan rule. It noted the inequity of re-
trying defendants whose convictions were reversed for insufficient evidence
because they might have received the acquittals to which they were entitled
if they had been before other trial judges. 125 Further, the Seventh Circuit
examined whether the "fairness rationale" would justify retrial. The court
concluded that it did not, since there is no societal interest in punishing a
defendant whose guilt is not clear and who was entitled to an acquittal at the
first trial as a matter of law. 126 Thus, the court felt that Bryan's holding was
not justifiable and was contrary to the objective of the double jeopardy
clause. However, instead of ignoring the Bryan rule, the Seventh Circuit
found Bryan not to be controlling. The court noted that the reversal in
Bryan was followed by a retrial in which the state was required to prove
every essential element of the crime, whereas, the remand in Sumpter
affirmed her conviction in part and only required the state to prove one of
the essential elements of the crime-her sex. Relying on this distinction, the
Seventh Circuit in a narrow holding held that the limited remand violated
Sumpter's double jeopardy rights.
127
It would be better jurisprudence to apply the "fairness rationale"
uniformly to all reversals whether they be grounded on insufficiency of the
evidence or based on procedural errors of law. The fairness rationale, unlike
the affirmative-waiver theory, focuses on the real constitutional principle.
The real constitutional principle is that society's interest in punishing the
guilty must be balanced against the defendant's right to a fair trial.128 The
controlling question should not be whether a defendant's attorney requested
a new trial as one of his many remedies on appeal. Utilization of the
"fairness rationale" would not automatically bar retrial of all defendants
whose convictions were reversed for insufficient evidence. For example,
some courts might feel that a full retrial of the defendant in Sumpter would
have been justified under the fairness rationale since her guilt was clear
except for the legal technicality of her sex. In most cases, however, if the
accused was given a fair trial but was convicted without sufficient evidence,
124. Sumpter v. DeGroote, 552 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1977). Before getting into federal
court, Sumpter appealed on the basis of double jeopardy to the Indiana Supreme Court.
Sumpter v. State, 261 Ind. 471, 340 N.E.2d 764 (1976). Her claim was iejected and, subse-
quently, her petition to the United States Supreme Court was denied. 425 U.S. 952 (1976).
125. Sumpter v. DeGroote, 552 F.2d 1206, 1211-12 (7th Cir. 1977).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1214-16.
128. See text accompanying notes 116-119 supra.
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the conviction should be reversed and the defendant should be acquitted by
the appellate court. Surely there is no societal interest in retrying a defendant
who could not as a matter of law be found guilty on the government's
evidence.
Federal courts are authorized to direct appellate acquittals under title
28, section 2106, of the United States Code' 29 and indeed many courts are
using this statutory authority to avoid the harshness of Bryan. 130 Such
acquittals are not necessarily final. The government can petition for a
rehearing as well as certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. These
appeals are not barred by the double jeopardy clause because their success
would merely result in the reinstatement of a guilty verdict.13'
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has viewed the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment to be aimed at the prevention of multiple prosecution,
not the prevention of government appeals. Consequently, the Court has
denied the defendant any benefit from errors of law made by a trial judge by
allowing the government to appeal wherever a second prosecution will not
be necessary. Thus, any appeal which will merely result in the reinstatement
of a guilty verdict is permitted. Accordingly, the government can appeal any
post-verdict order whether the order be a motion to suppress as in Morrison
or an acquittal as in Allison. Similarly, it can appeal any order that is
granted before the attachment of jeopardy because double jeopardy protec-
tion is only afforded once the accused has been placed in jeopardy. Thus, a
pre-trial dismissal of an indictment is appealable as in Serfass. Conversely,
those appeals which will necessitate a second prosecution are not permitted.
This is true even if a successful government appeal will not require a full
retrial but only further proceedings going to the elements of the offense
charged as in Jenkins. Therefore, double jeopardy bars any appeal from a
mid-trial acquittal as in Fong Foo or an acquittal after a mistrial as in
Martin.
However, the state is allowed to benefit from an error of law by the trial
judge because the government is allowed to re-try a defendant whose
conviction was reversed on appeal. This result is contrary to the main
objective of the double jeopardy clause, the prevention of multiple prosecu-
129. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 332 F.2d 1014 (6th Cir. 1964).
131. But see Sapir v. United States, 348 U.S. 373 (1955). The test for acquittal by an
appellate court is identical to the test applied by a trial court in determining a rule 29 acquittal.
The applicable standard is whether, viewing the evidence most favorable to the government,
reasonable minds could find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.
Arias-Diaz, 497 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1974).
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tions. The Court has offered rationales to explain this result. The fairness
rationale justifies retrial where the reversal is for a procedural error. It is
logically sound and examines the competing interests of society and the
accused. However, no logically sound justification exists for permitting
retrial where the reversal is for insufficient evidence. Instead, logic demands
that the government should not be able to re-try a defendant who, as a matter
of law, was entitled to an acquittal the first time. Yet courts since 1950 have
permitted retrial in this situation by following the affirmative-waiver theory.
The affirmative-waiver theory is clearly too weak to constitute a justifi-
cation for permitting a second prosecution which the government-appeal
cases prohibit. The Court has already rejected a closely related theory, the
presumptive-waiver theory; by noting that a defendant has no meaningful
choice in deciding whether to serve his sentence or appeal and waive
double jeopardy protection. Similarly, the affirmative-waiver theory does
not involve a meaningful choice because it forces a defendant to limit his
appeal to the sole issue of insufficiency. If he requests alternatively for a
new trial on the basis of procedural error, he waives double jeopardy
protection. The distinction between these two theories seems too slight to be
given constitutional significance. Indeed, it is legal fiction for courts to
continue to do so. Accordingly, courts forced by stare decisis to follow the
affirmative-waiver theory have been critical of the theory and have indicated
their reluctance to follow it, as seen in Sumpter and Robinson.
It is now time for the United States Supreme Court to take another
"closer look" at double jeopardy protection, this time for defendants whose
convictions are reversed for insufficiency of the evidence. Such a decision
will help to clarify the actions of lower courts and, hopefully, will terminate
the inequities caused by the affirmative-waiver theory.
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